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Abstract. Laboratory-based deception-detection experiments often fail to capture the 
features of everyday life lie detection among ordinary citizens. In this study, we examined 
how people [try to] detect deception in real life. Over 10 weeks, every time the participants 
felt they had detected a lie, they filled in an online survey. Results show that, in everyday 
life, many lies are detected unexpectedly, often from non-behavioral indicators, that people 
suspecting deception search for both behavioral cues and non-behavioral information, but 
that non-behavioral information is more useful to detect deception. The study addresses 
aspects unexplored in prior studies on everyday life lie detection, provides new insights, and 
has theoretical implications. 
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1. Introduction
Lying is considered a reprehensible form of social behavior, and children 
worldwide are socialized into honesty. An effective way to induce honesty is to 
foster in children the belief that lying will never go unnoticed, as it will generate 
specific emotions (e.g. shame) that will be revealed through behavioral cues 
(see Global Deception Research Team 2006). These practices may explain why 
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people worldwide believe that behavior reveals deceit, and why they share similar 
stereotypes about deceptive behavior (Global Deception Research Team 2006). 
Similar to lay people, scientists have traditionally believed that deception leaves 
apparent behavioral traces and have spent decades searching for them. Indeed, 
the most prominent theoretical perspectives in deception-detection research make 
specific predictions about ‘behavioral cues to deceit’ (e.g. Buller and Burgoon 1996, 
DePaulo et al. 2003, Ekman 2009, Zuckerman et al. 1981).
However, several meta-analyses cast serious doubt about the prospects of 
detecting deceit from behavior. First, the association between behavioral cues and 
deception is weak and under the influence of a host of moderator variables (DePaulo 
et al. 2003, Luke 2019, Sporer and Schwandt 2006, 2007). Second, across studies, 
observers’ accuracy in judging veracity from behavior is low: 54%, compared to 
50% chance accuracy (Bond and DePaulo 2006). Third, training observers to 
detect deception from behavioral observation alone yields only limited increases in 
detection accuracy (Hauch et al. 2016).
These meta-analytical conclusions draw a dim picture concerning humans’ 
prospect to detect deceit. However, one can question their relevance for everyday 
life lie detection. Most deception studies have been conducted in laboratory settings, 
and concerns have been raised that laboratory lie-detection experiments fail to 
mirror real-life deception and its detection (Levine 2018). In particular, there is 
some evidence that outside the laboratory most lies are detected from non-behavioral 
information rather than from behavioral cues, and that access to non-behavioral 
information boosts observers’ accuracy in judging veracity. We discuss these topics 
next.
1.1. Lie detection in the laboratory as compared to real-world settings
In a typical laboratory experiment, senders tell inconsequential truths and lies at 
the request of an experimenter. Observers, who are unacquainted with the senders, 
have to judge whether each sender is truthful or deceptive. Normally, the senders’ 
communications are either video-recorded, audio-recorded, typed or transcribed; 
thus, there is no opportunity for interaction. Finally, observers have to make their 
judgments immediately. Under these conditions, the only information available to 
observers is the senders’ behavior at the time the lie is told. As explained above, 
behavior is a poor marker of deception; this might explain the poor accuracy rates 
obtained in laboratory experiments.1
Conversely, in most everyday life circumstances, deception targets know the 
deceiver (background information) and can question him or her, both at the time the 
lie is told and later. Also, deception targets can determine whether the sender lied 
or told the truth long after the lie was told. This provides them with opportunities 
to carefully search for diagnostic non-behavioral information (such as tangible 
evidence, information from third parties, etc.). Detectors can also learn about the 
liar’s circumstances, in particular their incentives or motivations to deceive. In short, 
1 Here we depict the typical laboratory experiment, but not all experiments have all these features.
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a number of characteristics of real-life deceptive situations facilitate lie detection by 
enabling observers to access and use diagnostic non-behavioral information. While 
laboratory experiments tell us much about lie detection based on behavioral cues, 
they tell us very little about how people detect deception in real life.2
1.2. In real life, people detect deception from non-behavioral information
In a seminal study, Park, Levine, McCornack, Morrison and Ferrara (2002) 
asked college students to recall a lie they had detected in the past and to report how 
they detected it. The results showed that most everyday life lies are not revealed 
from behavioral cues, but from non-behavioral information such as third-person 
information, tangible evidence, inconsistencies with the detectors’ knowledge, and 
the liar’s confession. While behavioral cues are visible, vocal, and verbal behaviors 
[assumed to be] displayed by the sender at the time the lie is told (e.g. fidgeting, 
pauses, amount of detail in the statement…), non-behavioral information involves 
some knowledge about the context (i.e., knowledge that goes beyond the sender’s 
behavior during the specific deceptive exchange) that contradicts the deceptive 
statement (Blair et al. 2012; see also Blair et al.’s [2010] notion of ‘content in 
context’). Examples are pieces of information provided by witnesses or informed 
others, physical evidence, the detector’s specific knowledge about the deception 
topic, and the liars’ ultimate admission that the exchange was deceptive (see Park et 
al. 2002).
Besides the predominance of non-behavioral over behavioral indicators, Park 
et al. (2002) also found that most detected lies had been told by familiar senders 
(friends, romantic partners, family members…) and had been discovered hours, 
weeks, or months after being told. Park et al.’s results provide strong evidence 
that laboratory experiments do not capture the ordinary real-life conditions where 
deception judgments are made, that empirical results of laboratory experiments 
cannot be generalized to everyday-life circumstances, and that in everyday life it is 
non-behavioral information, rather than behavioral cues, that allows people to detect 
deceit.
Park et al.’s (2002) findings relative to the prominent role of non-behavioral 
information (compared to behavioral cues) in detecting real-life deception have been 
replicated more recently by Levine and Daiku (2019), Masip and Herrero (2015), 
Novotny et al. (2018), and Park and Lee (cited in Levine 2020). Masip and Sánchez 
(2019) conducted a mini meta-analysis of the four empirical studies available at 
the time and found that, across studies, 82% of the indicators reported were non-
behavioral, while only 17% were behavioral (but see Sánchez and Masip 2020, for a 
study failing to find this effect).
2 See Levine (2018) for additional differences between typical lie-detection laboratory experiments 
and real-life deception contexts.
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1.3. Non-behavioral information increases observers’ detection  
accuracy relative to behavioral cues
Empirical research shows that access to non-behavioral information, which is 
typically absent in laboratory experiments, facilitates lie detection. Across eight 
deception-detection experiments, Blair et al. (2010) found that while the accuracy 
rate of observers with access to behavioral cues only was 57%, the accuracy rate of 
observers with access to non-behavioral information in addition to behavioral cues 
was 75%. Similarly, Bond et al. (2013, Experiment 3) found an accuracy rate of 51% 
among observers with access to visible behavior only, and of 76% among those with 
access to non-behavioral information (the senders’ incentives to lie or tell the truth) 
in addition to visible behavior. A third group who only had access to non-behavioral 
information attained a 97% accuracy rate.3 In short, compared to a behavior-only 
condition, access to non-behavioral information increases observers’ accuracy in 
judging veracity (see also Blair et al. 2018).
One reason why non-behavioral information helps people judge veracity is that it 
allows observers to compare the sender’s statement with that [presumably] reliable 
information (Blair et al. 2010, 2012). This strategy consists of using the so-called 
correspondence criterion (Blair et al. 2018), which has long been considered by 
philosophers to be one way of determining whether a belief is true or false (see 
Dunwoody 2009). It is also consistent with the so-called situational familiarity 
hypothesis, according to which “in familiar contexts, observers are able to ‘visualize’ 
the situation in question and judge the plausibility and validity of verbal content” 
(Stiff et al. 1989: 560, see also Reinhard et al. 2011, 2012).
1.4. Summary
In short, while people worldwide believe that behavioral cues signal deception, 
the accumulated evidence indicates that behavior is a poor marker of deceit. 
Laboratory experiments show that people are poor truth/lie detectors, but this 
might be a consequence of experimental participants typically having access to 
behavioral cues only. Most everyday life lies are not detected from behavior but 
from non-behavioral information. Non-behavioral information is normally absent 
from laboratory experiments and has been shown to increase observers’ accuracy 
in judging veracity. Because laboratory experiments typically fail to capture the 
characteristics of everyday life deception and its detection, naturalistic studies are 
needed. We examined some unexplored topics outside the confines of the laboratory.
1.5. Theoretical background
Our goal in conducting this study was to examine how lies are detected outside 
the laboratory, in real-life circumstances. Two recent deception theories helped us 
make a number of predictions: Levine’s (2014, 2020) Truth-Default Theory (TDT) 
3 This is important because it shows that the superior accuracy of the behavior-and-context group was 
not just a consequence of that group having access to more information than the behavior-only group.
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and Street’s (2015) Adaptive Lie Detector account (ALIED). However, this research 
was not conceived to test any specific theory. Nor was it conceived to compare TDT 
against ALIED. In some respects, these two theories make similar predictions, but 
they differ in the posited underlying mechanisms. Ascertaining which theory is 
correct was indeed beyond the scope of this study, which was designed solely to 
explore how lies are detected in real life. 
Rather than a focused, unitary theory, Levine’s TDT is “a collection of quasi-
independent mini-theories, models, or effects that are joined by an overarching 
logic” (Levine 2014: 379). TDT is based on prior research by Levine and his 
colleagues, and it incorporates many of the findings reviewed above. TDT contains 
13 modules and 14 propositions. Those modules most relevant for this research are 
briefly summarized in Table 1, and the propositions (which we grouped under five 
separate topics) are in Table 2.
Street’s (2015) ALIED is more focused than TDT. It provides an account of the 
way humans make truth/lie judgments. Laboratory research shows that humans 
display a strong tendency to believe others are honest (e.g., Bond and DePaulo 2006). 
This tendency has been conceived as a cognitive bias. Street (2015) challenges this 
view, arguing that the truth ‘bias’ is actually a strategic attempt of the detector to 
make the best possible guess when telltale information is absent. More specifically, 
Table 1. Modules of truth-default theory  
(TDT; Levine 2014, 2020) most relevant for this research
Module Brief description
Deception motives Most people tell the truth most of the time, as they see no 
reason to lie unless the truth is inconsistent with their goals.
Veracity effect Because deceptive communication is infrequent, people 
normally assume others are truthful.
Projected motive model Because people know that others might lie if there is a good 
reason for it, whenever they think the sender has a motive to 
lie, they might doubt veracity.
How people really detect lies In everyday situations, most lies are detected because at some 
point, often long after the lie was told, some evidence comes 
out that contradicts the lie, or because the liar confesses.
Content in context Lie detection can be facilitated by knowing about the context 
where the specific communication happens.
Correspondence and coherence Contextual knowledge is useful because it allows the detector 
to use the correspondence criterion—that is, the detector 
can compare the communication content against contextual 
information. Correspondence is normally more indicative of 
veracity than the internal coherence of the message verbal 
content (i.e. lack of verbal contradictions).
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Table 2. Propositions of truth-default theory  
(TDT; Levine 2014, 2020) grouped according to topic
Topic Propositions (P)
Deception prevalence Most people tell the truth most of the time (P1), with most lies 
being told by just a few prolific liars (P2). In fact, ordinary 
people do not lie unless they cannot achieve their goals with 
the truth (P5).
Truth bias Because deception is rare, most of the time most people believe 
what others say (P3). This is adaptive and often results in 
efficient communication, but it also makes people vulnerable to 
deceit (P4).
Suspicion triggers However, under certain circumstances people might suspect 
deceit, such as when they believe that the sender has a 
good reason to lie (P6). Other factors triggering suspicion 
are (but are not limited to) behavioral cues stereotypically 
associated with deception, verbal inconsistencies, a lack 
of correspondence between the message content and the 
detector’s knowledge or beliefs, and third-person information 
contradicting the message (P7). Suspicion triggers may occur 
long after the lie was delivered (P10), and if they are strong 
enough, they might lead the person to scrutinize the message to 
assess its veracity (P8).
Deception detection People can resolve that a message is deceptive based on the 
sender’s behavior, internal inconsistencies in the message, the 
liar’s motivations, relevant information from third parties, or 
because the message contradicts the detector’s knowledge or 
beliefs (P9). However, because the act of lying does not elicit 
telltale behavioral markers of deception, the mere observation 
of the senders’ behavior at the time of lie delivery will not 
permit observers to accurately detect deception (P11). Rather, 
accurate lie detection typically occurs long after-the-fact and is 
based on external evidence, the correspondence criterion or the 
deceiver’s confession (P12).
Lie-detection skill While context-sensitive questioning of the sender can elicit 
diagnostic information, the wrong type of questioning might 
decrease truth and lie detection accuracy (P13). Expertise in 
lie detection is nor determined by any kind of skill to observe 
or interpret behavior, but by skill in eliciting diagnostic 
information from senders (P14).
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ALIED distinguishes between ‘individuating information’ and ‘context-general 
information’. The former is information about the truthfulness of a specific statement. 
For instance, Mark told Lara that he has never been to France, but Lara saw a picture 
of Mark next to the Eiffel tower. The picture is a piece of individuating information 
contradicting Mark’s statement. 
Unlike individuating information, context-general information does not refer to 
a specific statement but to statements in general. For example, the fact that people 
in general, and Mark in particular, are typically honest, is a piece of context-general 
information. It suggests that the probability that Mark’s current statement is deceptive 
is low. But it refers to statements in general, not to that specific statement of Mark. 
According to ALIED, when telltale individuating information is absent (as in 
most laboratory-based lie-detection studies), people use context-general information 
to make an informed guess. Indeed, Street et al. (2016) showed in an experiment that 
as individuating cues became less diagnostic of veracity, the participants relied more 
on context-general information to make their truth/lie judgments.
Note that while both ALIED and TDT predict a preponderance of truth judgments 
in most situations, the reason for this observable outcome differs. While ALIED 
posits it to be a strategic response to make the best possible guess (by considering 
that most people tell the truth most of the time), TDT understands it as a default, 
automatic response.
1.6. Unresolved issues
1.6.1. Strategies to detect deception
In the study by Park et al. (2002) and subsequent replications, the participants 
were asked to report how they had successfully detected a lie (revealing information). 
They were not asked to report everything they did to detect the lie (strategies used). 
This distinction is crucial, as the finding that most real-life lies are successfully 
detected from non-behavioral information does not necessarily mean that detectors 
do not actively seek for, or pay attention to, behavioral cues. Maybe they do, but 
because these cues ultimately do not allow them to detect deception, they don’t 
mention them when asked to list the cues that allowed them to detect the lie. We 
addressed this issue by asking participants to report everything they did to detect the 
lie, including unsuccessful strategies.
1.6.2. Unexpected lies
Participants in laboratory experiments are instructed to detect deception; thus, 
they actively scrutinize the senders’ communications to assess their veracity. But, 
according to TDT, if people are not prompted to expect deception, then the idea that 
the other person might be lying does not even come to mind (see the Veracity Effect 
module, as well as Propositions 3 and 4; for some real-world examples, see Gladwell 
2019). Therefore, they will not carefully examine the communication to ascertain its 
veracity (Clare and Levine 2019, Levine et al. 2020). 
Unlike what typically happens in laboratory experiments, in real life people 
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normally do not expect deception. Therefore, it is conceivable that a number of 
everyday lies are detected unexpectedly from highly telling non-behavioral cues 
without the deception target having ever entertained the idea that they had been 
deceived. Let us consider the following example: Last week, Lucy told her boyfriend 
John that she would not be able to meet him on Saturday because she needed to 
spend the full weekend studying hard for this week’s exam. John had no reason to 
think she was lying. However, earlier this week, John saw a picture on Facebook 
of a party that took place on Saturday night; in the picture, along with some other 
people, there is Lucy dancing and having fun with another young man (very telling 
non-behavioral indicator). 
Similar predictions can also be made based on ALIED. Typically, people 
are honest, and Lucy has been honest to John most of the time. Absent telltale 
individuating information, this context-general information would make it unlikely 
for John to consider that Lucy’s statement is deceptive. But, when John confronts a 
highly revealing piece of individuating information (the picture on Facebook), his 
view about the honesty of Lucy’s statement changes.  
In this study, participants had to indicate whether they had detected lies 
unexpectedly or following suspicion. Based on the theoretical frameworks above, 
we expected that under naturalistic, real-life conditions, a substantial proportion of 
lies would be detected unexpectedly.
1.7. The current study
Over a period of 10 weeks, every time the participants felt they had detected a lie 
they had to fill in an online survey to indicate, among other things, whether they had 
detected the lie unexpectedly (and, if so, how they had detected it) or whether they 
first had a suspicion and then did something to corroborate their suspicion (and, if so, 
they had to list everything they did, which specific strategies worked, which strategy 
had been the most useful one, and which had been the least useful one). 
Note that our goal was to study lie detection as it happens naturally in everyday 
life. Not content with just creating a naturalistic situation in the laboratory, we turned 
to actual deception-detection contexts. Senders were not randomly assigned to either 
lie or tell the truth, nor did we manipulate whom they would lie to, their motivations 
or the stakes. Detectors were free to use any strategy they wished to detect deception. 
They could either focus on behavioral cues or utilize non-behavioral information. 
Finally, no time constraints were imposed on them to make a veracity judgment.
1.8. Predictions
Because very little is known about everyday life lie detection, some aspects 
of this study were exploratory. Thus, while some predictions were in fact rather 
specific hypotheses (i.e. Predictions 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 below), others were tentative 
and unspecific (Predictions 1 and 3). Some aspects of interest could be examined 
based on descriptive data only. Note that we did not explore accuracy in detecting 
truths and lies; instead, our focus was on how people [try to] detect deception.
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People tell the truth most of the time (TDT Deception Motives module; TDT 
Proposition 1, P2, and P5). Therefore, individuals might assume that others are 
truthful (TDT Veracity Effect module; P3 and P4; Clare and Levine 2019) and, 
absent any reason for suspicion, will not be continuously alert trying to detect deceit. 
Similarly, people’s general tendency to be honest may lead individuals to consider 
that others are truthful in most situations (ALIED). Thus, we predicted that, on many 
occasions, lies would be revealed surprisingly and unexpectedly (Prediction 1), 
often on the basis of individuating non-behavioral information (Prediction 2), which 
is more telling than ambiguous behavioral displays (according to both, ALIED and 
TDT’s How People Really Detect Lies module, P11 and P12). 
If some individuals suspect deception (see P6 and P7), then they can use specific 
strategies to assess veracity (see TDT’s P8). We anticipated that participants would 
use not only strategies aimed at collecting non-behavioral information (hereafter 
‘non-behavioral strategies’ for short), but also strategies to observe or elicit behavioral 
cues (‘behavioral strategies’) (Prediction 3). This prediction was based on the allure 
of behavior for potential lie detectors. First, people worldwide believe that behavioral 
cues reveal deception (Global Deception Research Team 2006). Second, this belief is 
pervasive. Masip and Herrero (2015) first asked participants how lies can be detected. 
The participants mostly mentioned behavioral cues. Then, they asked participants to 
report how they had detected a lie in the past. The participants mentioned primarily 
non-behavioral indicators. That is, despite their experience in discovering lies from 
non-behavioral information, Masip and Herrero’s participants still believed that lies 
can be detected mostly from behavior. Third, people trying to detect deception feel 
inclined to use behavioral cues, even when more reliable information is available. 
In the experiment by Bond et al. (2013) described earlier, while the behavior-and-
context condition increased accuracy compared to the behavior-only condition, it 
decreased accuracy compared to the context-only condition. Thus, the mere presence 
of behavioral cues acted as a magnet, capturing the participants’ attention and 
limiting their accuracy.
Based on (a) the limited diagnostic value of behavioral cues, (b) TDT’s How 
People Really Detect Lies, Content in Context, and Correspondence and Coherence 
modules, and (c) TDT’s P11 and P12, we predicted that the most successful lie-
detection strategies would be non-behavioral rather than behavioral (Prediction 4), 
while the least successful strategies would be behavioral (Prediction 5). 
We also sought to replicate prior findings showing that deception detection often 
occurs long after the fact (TDT’s P10, P11, P12) (Prediction 6), and that discovered 
deception typically happens among family members and close friends rather than 
strangers (Park et al., 2002) (Prediction 7). Finally, because little is known about 
deception detection outside laboratory settings, we also explored some additional 
questions. These are not further discussed in the text due to space constraints, but 




Thirty college students signed up to participate in exchange for an academic 
incentive. However, five of them never replied to the online survey and were 
excluded from all analyses reported herein.4 Twenty-five participants remained (19 
females and six males; Mage = 20 years, SD = 1.38). Note that for most analyses the 
unit of analysis was not the participant, but either the lie (67 lies were reported), 
the lie indicator for unexpected lies (58 indicators) or the strategy used to detect 
suspected lies (44 strategies).
2.2. Procedure
The participants were invited to participate during a lecture. They were told that 
if they signed up to participate, then, during the period of the study, every time they 
felt they had discovered a lie they had to inform us by filling in an online survey. 
We explained that a lie is a deliberate attempt to create or maintain in another person 
a belief that the communicator considers false (Masip et al. 2004). We informed 
them that they were to report only those lies told specifically to them during face-
to-face interactions (which excluded lies told massively through the mass media). 
We stressed that, because our goal was to examine everyday life lie detection as it 
happens naturally, we expected them not to alter their typical behavior for the sake 
of the study.
Those interested in participating signed up online. An informed consent form 
was displayed on screen, and they were instructed to read it carefully and not to 
sign up if they did not feel comfortable doing so. The study was conducted in 
accordance with institutional, national, and international (e.g. the APA Ethics Code 
and the Declaration of Helsinki) ethical guidelines. Both the signup form and the 
study survey were placed at the electronic Moodle-based learning platform of the 
university. The students who had signed up were later informed via email about the 
day the study would begin. An online survey was available to participants during the 
time of the study (10 weeks). Table 3 lists all questions in the survey.
2.3. Coding
All responses to open questions were coded independently by two coders who 
were blind to the research predictions. Before coding, both coders read a manual with 
coding instructions and category descriptions. Some categories were based on those 
used in prior research. For instance, the definitions of non-behavioral vs. behavioral, 
as well as the separate categories of non-behavioral indicators, were adapted from 
Masip and Herrero (2015) and Park et al. (2002). Some other categories were 
defined anew, often using a data-driven approach (such as for relational closeness; 
4 We invited these five students to email us explaining why they reported no lies. Four of them replied; 
all four said they did not discover any lie over the 10-week period.
Nuria Sánchez, Jaume Masip, and Carmen Herrero
405Lie detection in everyday life
see below). The coders also underwent systematic training over several sessions. 
The training involved (a) describing the categories to the participants, (b) answering 
their questions, (c) substantial practice (with both examples that we created for 
the training as well as actual responses from other studies either published or in 
progress), and (d) extensive feedback. For some variables (e.g. behavioral vs. non-
behavioral strategy or indicator), the training additionally involved homework and 
subsequent feedback and clarification.
Specific categories and reliabilities are displayed in Table 4. To test Prediction 2, 
the deception indicators mentioned in response to Question 13 (see Table 3) were 
coded as behavioral or non-behavioral. Because most of them were non-behavioral, 
we also coded the specific kinds of non-behavioral information used (Table 4). 
Question 14 was asked to collect information to test Prediction 3 (behavioral 
vs. non-behavioral strategies). Note that Question 14 asked participants to list all 
strategies (not indicators) used; however, some participants mentioned indicators in 
addition to, or instead of, strategies. Some of these indicators, which we called elicited 
1. How confident are you that you were told a lie? (1-to-5 scale).
2. Which was the lie? Describe in detail the circumstances under which you were told the lie. If you 
can recall it, please write in detail what the liar told you exactly.
3. Do you think the topic of the lie is important? (1-to-5 scale)
4. What day did the lie happen?
5. On that day, at about what time did the lie happen?
6. What day did you detect the lie?
7. On that day, at about what time did you detect the lie?
8. What is your relationship with the liar?
9. Is the liar aware that you discovered the lie? (I believe the liar is aware / I believe the liar is not 
aware / I have no idea)
10. Why?
11. Describe in detail the circumstances surrounding the detection of the lie.
12. How did you detect the lie? (I first suspected that was a lie and did something to corroborate it / 
I discovered the lie unexpectedly)
* If “I discovered the lie unexpectedly” was chosen:
13. What did indicate you that this was a lie?
* If “I first suspected that was a lie and did something to corroborate it” was chosen:
14. What did you do to check your suspicion? Please report all strategies you 
used to find out whether that was a lie or not: What did you pay attention to 
or what did you do to find out whether that was a lie? Please, be exhaustive 
and report everything you did regardless of whether it worked or not.
15. Out of all the strategies you used, with which one(s) were you able to detect 
the lie?
16. Out of all the strategies you used, which was THE MOST useful to find out 
whether the person lied or not? Why?
17. Out of all the strategies you used, which was THE LEAST useful to find out 
whether the person lied or not? Why?
Note. In parentheses: scales used (for Questions 1 and 3) or response options (for Questions 9 and 12). For 
scales, higher ratings denoted more confidence (Question 1) or importance (Question 3).
Table 3. Questions in the survey
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Table 4. Reliabilities
Categories Kappa Percent 
agreement
Indicators Used to Detect Unexpected Lies (Q13)
Behavioral vs. Non-behavioral a .67 87.93
Non-behavioral Indicators Used to Detect Unexpected Lies (Q13) .75 82.93
Third-person Information .82 92.68
Evidence .70 85.37
Inconsistency with knowledge .66 87.80
Confession 1.00 100.00
Dispositional Honesty/Dishonesty 1.00 100.00
Other -- --
Strategies (Q14)
Behavioral vs. Non-behavioral b .93 95.45
Indicators (Q14)
Behavioral vs. Non-behavioral a .84 92.31
Indicators (from both Q13 and Q14)
Behavioral vs. Non-behavioral a .79 90.44
Useful (Q15)
Useful Strategy (Yes/No) .82 92.50
Useful Stand-alone Indicator (Yes/No) .76 92.68
Most Useful (Q16)
Most Useful Strategy (Yes/No) .75 87.50
Most Useful Stand-alone Indicator (Yes/No) .81 95.13
Least Useful (Q17)
Least Useful Strategy (Yes/No) 1.00 100.00
Least Useful Stand-alone Indicator (Yes/No) .88 97.56
Time Until Detection (Q4-Q7) .92 94.00
0 min – 10 min .88 94.03
> 10 min – 1h 1.00 100.00
> 1 h but same day .68 94.03
Next day 1.00 100.00
Two or more days 1.00 100.00
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indicators, were described as resulting from having used a specific strategy (e.g. “I 
asked him repeatedly [strategy] until he confessed [indicator]”), while others, which 
we called stand-alone indicators, were not explicitly connected to any strategy (e.g. 
“I know she was lying because she looked nervous”). Thus, as planned, strategies 
were coded as oriented to collect behavioral cues, non-behavioral information, both, 
or neither/impossible to tell (other category).5 However, in addition, we also coded 
indicators as behavioral, non-behavioral, both or neither/impossible to tell (other 
category). It also happened that sometimes, in their responses to Questions 2, 11, 
15, 16 or 17 (see Table3), the participants mentioned strategies or indicators not 
mentioned in their responses to Question 13 or 14. All these items were coded as if 
they had been reported in replying to Question 13 or 14. 
For each individual lie, coders also had to determine, out of all strategies and 
stand-alone indicators reported to detect that lie, which specific ones were mentioned 
by the participant as having been useful to detect the lie (Question 15), which one 
had been designated as the most useful (Question 16), and which one had been 
designated as the least useful (Question 17). These questions were asked to test 
Predictions 4 and 5. Coders also had to calculate how long it took to detect each lie 
from the responses to Questions 4 to 7 (Prediction 6), and then had to assign each lie 
to one of the time categories in Table 4. 
5 After the coding was finished, we noticed that in all cases where a participant said the strategy used 
was ‘asking the sender’ but did not specify the purpose of the strategy, the strategy was coded as 
behavioral. Note that this strategy can be either behavioral (e.g. asking questions to elicit behavioral 
cues), non-behavioral (e.g. asking questions to get a confession), or both. Therefore, these cases 
should have been allocated to the other category, which, surprisingly, was not used at all by the 
coders in coding either strategies or indicators. We therefore re-allocated these seven cases to the 
other category. With the original codings we still found support for the notion that useful (OR = 2.75, 
RD = 0.20) and most useful (OR = 5.23, RD = 0.28) strategies were non-behavioral rather than 
behavioral, but the effects were weaker than in the analyses presented in the text, which were 
conducted with the corrected data set.
Categories Kappa Percent 
agreement
Relational (Emotional) Closeness (Q8) .93 95.52
Close individuals .97 98.51
Family members 1.00 100.00
Close acquaintances .90 95.52
Distant acquaintances .79 97.01
Notes. Q13, Q14, etc. = Question 13, Question 14, etc. in the survey; -- = This category was not used by either 
coder; Reliabilities in the rows in italics were calculated across all subcategories, while reliabilities for the other 
rows were calculated based on a dichotomous decision (yes/no; present/absent; or behavioral/non-behavioral). 
a None of the coders used the both category nor the other category.
b None of the two coders used the both category and only one coder used the other category, where she coded 
just one strategy. The behavioral vs. non-behavioral reliabilities were calculated excluding this strategy. 
Separate reliabilities for behavioral and non-behavioral were Kappa = .87, percent agreement (PCA) = 95.45, 
and Kappa = .94, PCA = 97.73, respectively. 
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The participants’ responses to Question 8 (Prediction 7) were quite diverse, 
and sometimes it was hard to determine whether a specific relationship involved 
more or less relational-emotional closeness compared to others (e.g. brother-in-law, 
uncle, neighbor, classmate…). To resolve this issue, we conducted a small study 
(see Supplemental Files 2 at <https://bit.ly/3mRlVKc>). The final categories used 
by coders were close individuals (father/mother, brother/sister, romantic partner, 
friend), family members (‘family member’, grandparent/grandmother, uncle/aunt, 
cousin), close acquaintances (brother/sister in law, nephew/niece, former romantic 
partner, classmate, etc.), and distant acquaintances (acquaintance, someone living in 
my area, landlord/landlady, unacquainted person, etc.). It is clear from Table 4 that, 
overall, reliabilities were good for all categories in all variables.
3. Results
We report descriptive statistics and the results of non-parametric tests. The units 
of analysis were lies, detection strategies, or deception indicators. Although some 
participants reported more than one lie and some lies had been discovered with 
more than one strategy or indicator, in many cases ‘clusters’ (i.e. participants or 
reported lies) contained only one observation (see Supplemental Files 3 at <https://
bit.ly/3mRlVKc>). Still, to examine whether our observations were interrelated, 
we calculated a number of intraclass correlations coefficients (ICCs) for binary 
data (Paul et al. 2003, Ridout et al. 1999). The resulting ICCs were small and not 
significant, thus showing that the observations were not interrelated. A description 
of the ICC analyses is provided in Supplemental Files 3 <https://bit.ly/3mRlVKc>. 
3.1. Reported lies 
Overall, 67 lies were reported. The participants were very confident that the com-
munications had been deceptive (Question 1 in Table 3), M = 4.49 on a 1-to-5 scale, 
SD = 0.75; no one gave a score of 1 or 2, and 64% of the lies had a score of 5. The 
importance of the deception topic (Question 3) was moderate, M = 2.49, SD = 1.30, 
Mdn = 2, Mode = 2; however, seven lies had a score of 5 and nine had a score of 4.
3.2. Lies detected unexpectedly vs. after suspicion
Prediction 1 was that, in everyday life, many lies would be revealed unexpectedly. 
Indeed, 61.19% (i.e. 41 lies) of the 67 lies reported by the participants had been 
detected unexpectedly (M = 1.64 lies per participant, SD = 1.44). The remaining 
38.81% (26 lies) had been preceded by suspicion (M = 1.04, SD = 1.37).6 Similarly, 
6 The participants actually indicated that 43 lies (64.18%) had been detected unexpectedly and the 
remaining 24 (35.82%) after suspicion. However, the participants’ responses to the open questions 
in the survey revealed that four ‘unexpected’ lies had actually been preceded by suspicion (and 
the participants subsequently used specific strategies to corroborate their suspicion), while two 
‘suspected’ lies had actually been discovered unexpectedly.
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while 84% of participants reported unexpected lies, only 56% reported lies detected 
after suspicion. In short, the data show that, in everyday life, a substantial proportion 
of the lies that are detected are discovered unexpectedly. (For more descriptive data 
concerning both unexpected and suspected lies, see Supplemental Files 4 at <https://
bit.ly/3mRlVKc>.)
3.3. Lies detected unexpectedly: indicators
We predicted that unexpected lies would be detected mostly from non-behavioral 
information rather than from behavioral cues (Prediction 2). This prediction was 
supported: participants mentioned 58 indicators that revealed the 41 unexpected 
lies (M = 1.41 indicators per lie, SD = 0.71); out of these, 82.76% (48 indicators) 
were non-behavioral, while the remaining 17.24% (10 indicators) were behavioral, 
χ 2 (1) = 24.90, p < .001.7 The non-behavioral indicator mentioned most often was 
evidence (45.83%), followed by inconsistencies with knowledge (22.92%), third-
person information (18.75%), the liar’s confession (10.42%), and dispositional 
honesty/dishonesty (2.08%).
3.4. Lies detected following suspicion: strategies and indicators
Although Questions 14 to 17 asked participants about their lie-detection 
strategies, many participants reported indicators rather than, or in addition to, 
strategies. Specifically, participants mentioned 44 strategies, 33 indicators obtained 
as a result of having used a strategy (elicited indicators) and 45 indicators not 
explicitly connected to any strategy (stand-alone indicators).
3.4.1. Quality of strategies and indicators
Table 5 shows how many strategies and indicators were behavioral vs. non-
behavioral. As anticipated in Prediction 3, participants did not use only non-behavioral 
strategies, but also behavioral ones. Specifically, one out of every three strategies 
was behavioral. Similarly, two out of every five indicators were also behavioral. Chi-
square tests comparing the number of non-behavioral and behavioral strategies and 
indicators failed to reach significance; for strategies, χ2 (1) = 2.19, p = .139; for all 
indicators, χ2 (1) = 1.85, p = .174; for elicited indicators, χ2 (1) = 0.03, p = .862; for 
stand-alone indicators, χ2 (1) = 2.69, p = .101.
3.4.2. Usefulness of strategies and stand-alone indicators8
Because our focus was on strategies rather than indicators, Questions 15 to 
17 asked participants about useful, most useful, and least useful strategies (not 
7 This test (and several other chi-square tests reported herein) corresponds to a comparison between 
two proportions, not a 2 x 2 table. Therefore, phi cannot be calculated.
8 As explained in note 6, four suspected lies were designated as unexpected by the participants. 
Because of that, no information was collected about the usefulness of the four strategies, four elicited 
indicators, and four stand-alone indicators used to detect these lies, which are therefore not included 
in the analyses described in this section.
410
indicators). However, some participants mentioned indicators in responding to these 
questions. To deal with this problem, we instructed coders to do the following: 
(a) If a participant had indicated that a specific strategy had been useful, the most 
useful, or the least useful to detect the corresponding lie, that strategy was coded that 
way; (b) if a participant had indicated that an elicited cue had been useful, the most 
useful, or the least useful, then the strategy that elicited that cue was coded as useful, 
the most useful, or the least useful; (c) if a participant had indicated that a stand-
alone indicator had been useful, the most useful, or the least useful, then it was that 
indicator what was coded as useful, the most useful, or the least useful. 
As shown in Table 6, about two out of every three strategies were considered 
useful, nearly one half of strategies were designated as the most useful one to detect 
that specific lie, and only 20% were considered as the least useful. Apparently, 
whenever people suspect deception, they know which strategies they need to use to 







































Strategies 44 14 31.82 23 52.27 7 15.91
Indicators 78 33 42.31 45 57.69 0 0.00
Elicited 33 16 48.48 17 51.52 0 0.00
Stand-alone 45 17 37.78 28 62.22 0 0.00
Table 5. Frequencies and percentages of behavioral, non-behavioral, 







































Strategies 40 27 67.50 19 47.50 8 20.00
Stand-alone 
indicators
41 9 21.95 6 14.63 5 12.20
a Excluding four strategies and four stand-alone indicators used to detect four suspected lies that the participants 
had designated as unexpected.
Table 6. Frequencies and percentages of useful, most useful, and least useful strategies and 
stand-alone indicators employed to corroborate suspected lies
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most useful or least useful (Table 6), which impeded conducting additional tests. 
Unfortunately, the small frequency for least useful strategies also impeded us to 
test Prediction 5, but we could test whether the most useful strategies were non-
behavioral rather than behavioral (Prediction 4).
Table 7 displays how many strategies designated as useful and how many of those 
not designated as useful were behavioral, non-behavioral, or pertained to the other 
category. It also contains the same information for strategies named/not named as the 
most useful. Visual inspection suggests that most strategies designated as useful (or 
as most useful) were non-behavioral, while strategies not designated as such tended 
to be behavioral. Odds ratio (OR) and risk difference (RD) analyses supported these 
impressions. For useful strategies, OR = 5.33 (i.e. the odds of a strategy designated 
as useful being non-behavioral in proportion with a strategy not mentioned as useful 
being non-behavioral were 5.33), and RD = .40 (i.e. strategies designated as useful 
were 40% more likely to be non-behavioral than strategies not designated as useful). 
For most useful strategies the effects were even stronger, OR = 7.00 and RD = .44. 
As benchmarks, please note that OR = 2.0 can be considered a “recommended 
minimum effect size representing a ‘practically’ significant effect for social science 
data” (Ferguson 2009: 533), OR = 3.0 a moderate effect, and OR = 4.0 a strong effect 
(Ferguson 2009). In short, as anticipated (Prediction 4), both useful and the most 
useful strategies were non-behavioral rather than behavioral.
3.5. Time until detection and relational or emotional closeness
In line with Prediction 6, only 43% of lies were detected at the time they were 
told or shortly thereafter (within 10 min). Descriptive data are displayed in Table 8. 



































27 7 25.93 16 59.26 4 14.81
Not designated  
as useful
13 7 53.85 3 23.08 3 23.08
Designated  
as most useful
19 4 21.05 14 73.68 1 5.26
Not designated  
as most useful
21 10 47.62 5 23.81 6 28.57
Table 7. Frequencies and percentages of strategies designated/not designated as useful or  
most useful that were behavioral, non-behavioral, or allocated to the other category
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(Prediction 7) was not supported (Table 8). Apparently, the real factor behind 
the number of discovered lies was not emotional closeness but opportunity for 
interaction. One has more opportunities to interact with close individuals and close 
acquaintances than with more distant family members and distant acquaintances. 
Indeed, across both groups with high opportunity for interaction, the number of lies 
was 56 (83.58%), while across the two groups with low opportunity for interaction it 
was only 11 (16.42%), χ2 (1) = 30.22, p < .001. Because the original four categories 
were not designed to capture opportunity for interaction but relational-emotional 
closeness, two new coders coded all 67 responses to Question 8 as high or low 
in opportunity for interaction9 (Kappa = .95, percent agreement = 98.50). Again, 
data showed that significantly more lies had been told by people with whom the 
participants could interact easily (54 lies, 80.60%) than by people with whom they 
could not interact so easily (13 lies, 19.40%), χ2 (1) = 25.09, p < .001.
9 Responses to be coded as high in opportunity for interaction were father/mother, brother/sister, 
romantic partner, friend, classmate, ‘someone I have a good relationship with’, and residence-dorm 
mate/flatmate. Responses to be coded as low were ‘family member’, grandparent/grandmother, 
uncle/aunt, cousin, brother/sister-in-law, former romantic partner, nephew/niece, new acquaintance, 




0 min – 10 min 29 43.28
> 10 min – 1h 7 10.45
> 1 h but same day 7 10.45
Next day 10 14.93
Two or more days 14 20.90
Relationship
Close individuals 33 49.25
Family members 7 10.45
Close acquaintances 23 34.33
Distant acquaintances 4 5.97
Table 8. Frequencies and percentages for the time until discovery  
and the relationship categories
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4. Discussion
Hundreds of deception-detection studies have been conducted over the last half 
a century; however, most of them fail to capture the features of everyday life lie 
detection. Recently, an interesting new wave of research has emerged considering 
interactive situations where the interviewer adopts an active role to elicit deception 
cues (e.g. Vrij 2014). This interesting new trend of research acknowledges at least 
two limitations of traditional laboratory experiments, namely, that the sender’s 
spontaneous behavior is poorly related to veracity and that interacting with the 
sender might facilitate lie detection. However, its focus is on designing interview 
approaches to help practitioners detect deception in forensic or intelligence contexts. 
It does not describe strategies and cues ordinary citizens use to detect lies in their 
everyday-life interactions. We aimed at filling this gap in deception research.
Our findings expand the conclusions of the few extant studies on the topic. 
These studies did not examine whether lies are detected unexpectedly of after using 
specific strategies following suspicion. We addressed this issue and found that 61% 
of lies were revealed unexpectedly, normally (83% of the time) from non-behavioral 
information. These are novel findings that are consistent with both theoretical 
frameworks (TDT and ALIED): Because typically people are honest, there is no 
reason to think a message is deceptive unless specific ‘hard evidence’ (tangible proofs, 
third-person information, the liar’s admission…) is available revealing the lie. Note 
that, consistent with ALIED, almost all categories of non-behavioral information 
are instances of individuating information. Also in line with ALIED, dispositional 
honesty (which is context-general information) was mentioned only rarely.
It might seem that unexpected lie discovery is inconsistent with TDT. According 
to TDT, lie detection happens only after certain factors elicit suspicion, the detector 
takes specific steps to corroborate their suspicion, and finally telltale non-behavioral 
indicators reveal the lie. However, rather than falsifying this process, the current 
results suggest that sometimes triggers are so strong that they not only arouse 
suspicion but expose the lie altogether. This happens mostly when these triggers are 
telltale non-behavioral indicators rather than vague and unspecific behavioral cues.10 
We also found that many lies were detected after suspicion in a way consistent with 
TDT. Thus, rather than falsifying TDT, the current findings expand the theory by 
suggesting additional ways lies are detected in real life. Since TDT is a modular 
theory with diverse but coherent ‘mini-theories, models, or effects’ (Levine 2014: 
379), there is room for it to incorporate this new finding.
We just discussed that in everyday circumstances people rarely make deception 
judgments. Additional support for this notion comes from the small frequency of lies 
discovered overall. Over 10 weeks, 25 participants reported 67 lies. Recall that five 
additional participants reported no lies at all and that four of them informed that they 
never discovered any lie (see note 4). Therefore, over the course of one week, each of 
29 participants detected only 0.23 lies on average. Or, put another way, they detected 
10 Yet, this does not mean that non-behavioral indicators always unveil the lie; they also play a major 
role in merely eliciting suspicion (see Masip and Sánchez 2019).
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just about one lie every four weeks. This is a surprisingly low rate, particularly if 
mere participation in the study made participants somewhat wary of deception. 
Research on lie prevalence (for a review, see Chapter 9 in Levine 2020) shows that, 
on average, people lie once or twice a day. Although the lie-prevalence distribution 
is very skewed, such that most people lie only rarely and a few individuals lie very 
often, it is very likely that our participants were exposed to more than just one lie 
every four weeks, given the high number of interactions typical students are involved 
in (DePaulo et al. 1996).11 The current data reveal that, in real life, whenever there is 
no apparent trigger, many lies go undetected. 
While cues revealing unexpected lies are typically non-behavioral, we found, 
as predicted, that whenever people suspect deceit they search for, and focus on, 
behavioral cues in addition to non-behavioral information. This novel finding aligns 
with prior research showing that behavioral cues have a strong magnetism over 
individuals trying to detect deception (Bond et al. 2013, Global Deception Research 
Team 2006). However, observers would be well advised to dismiss behavioral cues 
altogether and focus instead on non-behavioral information only: In this study, useful 
strategies (and the most useful strategy to detect each lie) were much more often non-
behavioral than strategies not tagged as useful (or as most useful). We also predicted 
that the majority of least useful strategies would be behavioral but, unfortunately, 
the small frequencies prevented us from formally testing this prediction. Finally, 
consistent with prior research, we found that many lies (57%) were not detected 
immediately (though this effect was much stronger in the seminal work by Park et al. 
[2002] than in both this study and Masip and Herrero’s [2015] research).
These findings qualify the conclusions of prior studies (Levine and Daiku 2019, 
Masip and Herrero 2015, Masip and Sánchez 2019, Novotny et al. 2018, Park et 
al. 2002, Sánchez and Masip 2020). Participants in previous studies were asked 
to describe how they had detected a lie (revealing indicators), and they reported 
mostly non-behavioral indicators. However, prior research did not differentiate 
between unexpected and suspected lies. We found that over 80% of unexpected 
lies were detected from non-behavioral information. Therefore, if unexpected lies 
were over-represented in prior research, this might have increased the reporting of 
non-behavioral indicators. Our data, however, also show that prior outcomes might 
have been obtained without any remarkable over-abundance of unexpected lies, 
as [the most] useful strategies focused on non-behavioral rather than behavioral 
information. In short, although participants suspecting deception use both behavioral 
and non-behavioral information (as shown in this study), they reported primarily 
non-behavioral indicators in prior studies probably because these were the specific 
kind of indicators that actually revealed the lies. In line with previous research, this 
study supports the superiority of non-behavioral information over behavioral cues 
in unveiling lies (both unexpected and suspected ones). But it also adds to prior 
findings the notion that participants still search for, and focus on, behavioral cues. 
11 According to DePaulo et al.’s (1996) data, on average, every day students are involved in almost 
seven social interactions lasting 10 min or more (plus an unknown number of shorter interactions).
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We also examined whose lies are detected. Contrary to Prediction 7, relational-
emotional closeness was not significantly associated with the number of lies 
discovered. Instead, opportunity for interaction was. These two variables might 
have been correlated in prior research, but they are conceptually different (DePaulo 
and Kashy 1998). A positive correlation between emotional closeness and reported 
lies would suggest either that (a) people lie more often to emotionally close others 
than to more distant individuals, or (b) people are particularly adept at detecting the 
deceptions of emotionally-close others. Close individuals do seem to be better able 
to detect real-life lies than more distant individuals (DePaulo and Kashy 1998), but 
research shows that people lie less often to individuals to whom they feel closer 
(DePaulo and Kashy 1998, Smith et al. 2014). Our data suggest that, provided 
there is opportunity for interaction, people might lie to distant acquaintances.12 It is, 
however, interesting that participants were able to use non-behavioral information to 
detect the lies of even distant acquaintances (but note that this finding is in line with 
Masip and Herrero’s [2015] results for police officers).
4.1. Limitations and future research
This study is not without limitations. First, a weakness of prior studies examining 
real-life lie detection is that one cannot assert with full confidence that all the ‘lies’ 
that respondents reported were in fact lies. We partially addressed this issue by 
measuring the participants’ confidence that they detected a lie. Confidence ratings 
were extremely high, but the participants’ perceptions can still differ from the 
objective reality. However, our study did not pretend to examine observers’ accuracy 
in detecting everyday life lies; rather, it focused on the strategies people use when 
they suspect deception. 
Second (and relatedly), this study relied on self-reports. The participants’ 
impressions may be subjective and under the influence of a number of biases. 
However, while caution is warranted in interpreting the results, this limitation is 
inherent to all studies based on self-report measures. Given the non-sensitive nature 
of the topic, it is unlikely that social desirability bias, self-esteem protection, or similar 
factors distorted the participants’ responses. Furthermore, some findings (such as 
the prevalence of non-behavioral over behavioral indicators of unexpected lies, or 
the preponderance of non-behavioral strategies among those designated as useful) 
are contrary to stereotypical beliefs that could have influenced the participants’ 
responses (such as the belief that behavioral cues reveal deception). Unfortunately, 
the study of certain phenomena as they happen in real life leaves no option but to 
rely on self-reports. 
12 Contrary to DePaulo and Kashy (1998), Whitty et al. (2012) found a positive association between 
relational closeness and frequency of lying, but, in line with our arguments, they speculated that 
opportunity for interaction (which unfortunately they did not measure) could be responsible for the 
effect. Yet, in DePaulo and Kashy’s (1998) study, frequency of interaction did not predict the rate 
of lying when the effect of relational closeness was partialled out. Clearly, more research is needed 
to disentangle the impact of relational closeness and opportunity for interaction on the frequency of 
lying.
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Third, one can wonder whether Prediction 1 can be tested with our design. 
Although we stressed that we were interested in naturalistic situations and asked 
participants to behave as usual, it would be naïve to assume that they acted as if they 
had not been prompted. Yet, prompting (a) certainly did not increase the number 
of unexpected lies reported, as the participants themselves designated these lies as 
unexpected and surprising; (b) might have increased suspicion, but suspected lies 
were not the focus of the study, only detected lies were. Prompting might also have 
decreased the participants’ truth bias in assessing whether suspected lies were actually 
lies, but we believe this is unlikely. First, if participants had lowered their criteria 
to classify messages as deceptive, they would classify many messages as deceptive, 
but probably with low certainty. However, mean deceptiveness ratings were 4.49 
on a 1-to-5 scale, and no lie scored 1 or 2. Second, the surprisingly low number of 
lies reported strongly suggests that participants did not substantially abandon their 
truth bias. Indeed, actively questioning the veracity of all incoming messages for a 
sustained period of ten weeks would be so cognitively demanding that no normal 
human being would be able to do it.
Another limitation of this study is that it is possible that some participants 
suspected deception but did nothing to corroborate their suspicion, or that they did 
but were unsuccessful. While these possibilities are interesting and deserve empirical 
scrutiny, they were beyond the goals of the current study, which focused on lies that 
the participants felt they had ultimately discovered.
Finally, although the number of both reported lies and strategies was relatively 
large, only a few strategies were designated as least useful by the participants. This 
made it impossible to formally test Prediction 5. Future studies should be conducted 
with more strategies. This would also permit deeper explorations. For instance, 
a taxonomy of strategies could be made and the effectiveness of each [type of] 
strategy could be examined. Identifying effective strategies can be useful, as these 
can subsequently be taught to practitioners whose jobs require assessing deception – 
such as law-enforcement officers, judges, intelligence personnel, etc. 
To conclude, little is known about lie detection by ordinary individuals in 
everyday life. This study examined the strategies and indicators people use to detect 
lies in real-life contexts, outside the confines of the laboratory. It provides some 
new insights that contribute to our understanding of real-life lie detection. It also 
yields some new knowledge that could be incorporated to theory. We hope additional 
research will follow, further increasing our still limited knowledge about how people 
[try to] detect deception in everyday life.
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